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La longue visite (trois jours) effectuée cette semaine en Israël et à
Ramallah par le Président des Etats-Unis à été particulièrement
importante. Monsieur Bush a –t-il été en mesure d’amener les parties à
engager les négociations de manière sérieuse, formule qui sous-entend
qu’elles ne l’ont pas été jusqu’à présent ? Le proche avenir permettra
de le vérifier. Toutefois il est évident que sans l’implication de
l’Exécutif américain le processus de paix serait définitivement
bloqué. Ce n’est que deux jours avant la visite du Président Bush que
les discussions ont pu être relancées grâce aux efforts personnels du
Premier ministre israélien et du Président palestinien. Monsieur Bush
a annoncé qu’il reviendrait en mai et ferait le déplacement autant de
fois que cela serait nécessaire pour faciliter l’achèvement des
négociations avant la fin de l’année. Les parties sont donc sous
pression, mais l’aiguillon suffira-t-il pour faire avancer Israël ?
Dans les deux camps le processus de paix est engagé sans bénéficier
d’un consensus national. M. Ehud Olmert peut-il stopper le projet de
colonisation à Har Homa alors que le Maire de Jérusalem appartient à
un parti politique radicalement opposé à la division de la ville ? Que
vaut sa promesse de mettre fin aux colonies sauvages en Cisjordanie,
alors que M. Ariel Sharon n’avait pas été en mesure d’honorer la
sienne ?
Ceux qui suivent l’activité diplomatique des Etats-Unis connaissent
les nombreuses différences qui opposent leurs positions à celles
d’Israël. Elles sont apparues clairement au cours de la visite du
Président Bush. Bien entendu les Israéliens ont entendu plein de
bonnes choses sur la sécurité de leur pays, mais ils ont aussi
été invités à suivre un certain nombre de directives énoncées ou plutôt
rappelées par les Etats-Unis, membre du Quatuor. Ces orientations sont
à la fois générales, parce que qu’elles n’affectent pas la liberté des
parties en ce qui concerne le contenu de leur futur accord, et
contraignantes pour Israël qui devra modifier son point de vue de
manière à prendre en compte –effort surhumain ?- les intérêts
palestiniens. Les Israéliens ont semblé un peu surpris d'entendre leur
partenaire privilégié évoquer la "colonisation" à Jérusalem,
l'"occupation" pour tous les territoires détenus depuis 1967, la
pleine souveraineté et indépendance de l'Etat palestinien, la
continuité territoriale de cet Etat, etc. La fameuse lettre arrachée à
George Bush en 2004 par Ariel Sharon a donné lieu à des échanges assez
vifs entre Israéliens et Américains... Ce recadrage et ces mises au
point étaient avant tout destinées à faire comprendre aux Israéliens
que ces derniers ne dictent pas la politique des Etats-Unis. Ils sont
avertis que leur allié ne les aidera pas à se dispenser d'un
consentement libre et éclairé exprimé par les Palestiniens. Le
Département d'Etat et le Président se positionnent sur la ligne du
consensus international ; ils montrent ainsi à leurs amis le chemin
qu'ils devront parcourir pour bénéficier d'un appui international. Le
désaccord n'est cependant pas systématique. Ainsi leurs analyses
convergent en ce qui concerne la question des réfugiés palestiniens ou
la priorité attribuée à la sécurité d'Israël et de ses nationaux. Il
reste à espérer que le message d'amicale franchise qui leur a été
délivré sera reçu par les Israéliens qui, souvent, n'écoutent que ce
qu'ils veulent bien entendre.
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L'entretien du Premier
ministre israélien au Jerusalem Post
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1198517257586&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FSowFull
L'important entretien donné par E.
Olmert au JPost le 1er janvier 2008 a pour objet de rallier
l'opinion israélienne à la solution de deux Etats et sans doute
aussi de la convaincre de la capacité de son gouvernement à
défendre les intérêts du pays dans le processus de paix. Il me
semble que la lecture de ce texte très récent est indispensable
pour comprendre l'attitude adoptée par la diplomatie des
Etats-Unis et les propos tenus par ses représentants au cours du
voyage du Président Bush en Israël.
"Indeed, his primary responsibility as prime minister, Olmert
said, lay in ensuring a separation from the Palestinians.
"What will be if we don't want to separate?" he asked
rhetorically. "Will we live eternally in a confused reality
where 50 percent of the population or more are residents but not
equal citizens who have the right to vote like us? My job as
prime minister, more than anything else, is to ensure that
doesn't happen."
The reality in which Israel was seeking an accommodation, he
elaborated, includes a situation in which even "the world that
is friendly to Israel... that really supports Israel, when it
speaks of the future, it speaks of Israel in terms of the '67
borders. It speaks of the division of Jerusalem."
What was extraordinary about US President George W. Bush, in
this context, Olmert said, was that Bush, since a landmark
letter he wrote to then-prime minister Ariel Sharon in 2004, has
made plain that he envisages Israel maintaining at least some
territory in Judea and Samaria. Bush "has already said '67
plus," said Olmert, "and that's an amazing achievement for
Israel."
Thus, Olmert asserted, while the road map obligated Israel to
stop all building in the settlements, including for natural
growth, the Bush letter "renders flexible to a degree the
significance of what is written in the road map."
In comments likely to further exacerbate Palestinian protest at
ongoing settlement expansion, Olmert said he considered Ma'aleh
Adumim to be "an indivisible part of Jerusalem and the State of
Israel. I don't think when people are talking about settlements
they are talking about Ma'aleh Adumim."
At the same time, the prime minister expressed considerable
empathy for Palestinian concerns over settlement growth. If the
only construction work undertaken since the road map was
accepted had been at Ma'aleh Adumim and Har Homa, he said, "then
I imagine the Palestinians, though they might not have been
happy about it, would not have responded in the way that they
respond when every year, all the settlements - in all the
territories - continue to grow. There is a certain contradiction
in this between what we're actually seeing and what we ourselves
promised. We always complain about the [breached] promises of
the other side. Obligations are not only to be demanded of
others, but they must also be honored by ourselves."
While all the final-status issues were now on the table as part
of the Annapolis process, Olmert stressed that he would never
accept a Palestinian "right of return" to Israel.
He said he was convinced, too, that Palestinian Authority
President Mahmoud Abbas "has made the choice in his heart"
between clinging to the "myth of the 'right of return'" and the
opportunity to establish a Palestinian state where all
Palestinians, refugees included, would live.
"My impression is that he wants peace with Israel, and accepts
Israel as Israel defines itself," Olmert said. "If you ask him
to say that he sees Israel as a Jewish state, he will not say
that. But if you ask me whether in his soul he accepts Israel,
as Israel defines itself, I think he does. That is not
insignificant. It is perhaps not enough, but it is not
insignificant."
Asked whether next week's first Bush
presidential
visit was designed for Bush to become the godfather of the State
of Palestine, Olmert said, "I don't think he would define a
visit like this in those terms... He's coming as an expression
of his friendship. Also, he's coming to give expression to his
support for the diplomatic process."
Bush was not pressuring Israel in any way, Olmert said. "He's
not doing a single thing that I don't agree to," he said. "He
doesn't support anything that I oppose." Rather, Olmert said,
both he and the president hoped that the Annapolis timetable,
for an accord in the course of 2008, could be met.
Indeed, said the prime minister, there was currently an almost
divinely ordained constellation of key personalities on the
international stage favorably disposed to Israel, creating
comfortable conditions for negotiations that might never be
replicated.
"It's a coincidence that is almost 'the hand of God,'" Olmert
said, "that Bush is president of the United States, that Nicolas
Sarkozy is the president of France, that Angela Merkel is the
chancellor of Germany, that Gordon Brown is the prime minister
of England and that the special envoy to the Middle East is Tony
Blair."
The imperative, he said, was to make every effort for progress
while this array of supportive characters remained in place.
"What possible combination," he asked, "could be more
comfortable for the State of Israel?"
Olmert said he believes "with all my heart" that kidnapped IDF
soldier Gilad Schalit is alive and that he was "making every
effort" to determine the situation of captive reservists Eldad
Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. He said he favored re-examining the
criteria for Palestinian prisoner releases because "it may be
that there is room for more precise definitions of what
constitutes 'blood on hands.'" "
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G. BUSH :
les manœuvres des responsables politiques opposés à la
paix sont le principal obstacle à cette dernière
Q The major obstacle to peace is the settlement activities. Would you
request from Prime Minister Olmert a freeze on the settlements?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the major obstacle to peace is going to be the
politics of both Palestinians and Israelis trying to take advantage of
the difficult work that these two leaders are going to have to do to
define a state; that's what I think. I think that extremists, in some
instances, will try to stop the peace. I believe there is a lot of
forces at play in Israel that will try to stop these two men from
defining what a state will look like. And my job is to help them stay
on the big picture, and have the confidence necessary to make tough
decisions.
Les règles cardinales de la paix
Président George Bush
The point of departure for permanent status negotiations to realize
this vision seems clear: There should be an end to the occupation that
began in 1967. The agreement must establish Palestine as a homeland
for the Palestinian people, just as Israel is a homeland for the
Jewish people. These negotiations must ensure that Israel has secure,
recognized, and defensible borders. And they must ensure that the
state of Palestine is viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.
Président
George Bush
I
came away encouraged by my meetings with Israeli and Palestinian
leaders. Each side understands that the key to achieving its own goals
is helping the other side achieve its goals. For the Israelis, their
main goal is ensuring the safety of their people and the security
of their nation. For the Palestinians, the goal is a state of
their own, where they can enjoy the dignity that comes with
sovereignty and self-government.
In plain language, the result must be the establishment of a free
and democratic homeland for the Palestinian people, just as Israel is
a free and democratic homeland for the Jewish people. For this to
happen, the Israelis must have secure, recognized, and defensible
borders. And the Palestinians must have a state that is viable,
contiguous, sovereign, and independent. Achieving this vision will
require tough decisions and painful concessions from both sides.
Le rôle des Etats-Unis dans les négociations
bilatérales, une assistance dans les limites de la neutralité.
Président
George Bush
It's essential that people understand America cannot dictate the terms
of what a state will look like. The only way to have lasting peace,
the only way for an agreement to mean anything, is for the two parties
to come together and make the difficult choices. But we'll help, and
we want to help. If it looks like there needs to be a little pressure,
Mr. Prime Minister, you know me well enough to know I'll be more than
willing to provide it. I will say the same thing to President Abbas
tomorrow, as well.
Condoleezza
Rice
The President is
going to be making statements all along the way as to how we see
things starting to come together. But as he said, this isn't to put
out an American position and say, here, you have to go to that
position. But rather what he did was to listen to the parties, to put
forward how he sees what they are seeing as the way forward. And
that's extremely helpful, because one thing that you find when they're
negotiating is that sometimes, as much as they're talking and
negotiating, it's hard for them to see where they are, to see where
there are positions that are likely to be common positions.
And so I think it
was extremely helpful to do essentially a summary. Many of these
positions have been taken by the United States before, but I think
it's the first time the President has put it together in this
codified, coherent way.
Annapolis et la feuille de route, une approche moins
rigide, plus intégrée et globale.
Condoleezza Rice
haven't seen the
Arab League position, but what I heard the President say was that the
settlement issue needs to be resolved as a first phase of the road map
issue; that it is the position of the United States that Israel should
not engage in settlement expansion; and that it ought to do nothing
that would forestall any -- or that would try and pre-judge a final
status agreement. So that's what he said.
Now, the other
thing that he said is that it is important, even though both sides
have not fully fulfilled their first phase road map obligations, to go
ahead and negotiate toward the final status agreement. In other words,
you don't want people to get hung up on settlement activity or the
fact that the Palestinians haven't fully been able to deal with the
terrorist infrastructure and prevent that from moving forward on the
negotiations. There are really three tracks: people need to fulfill
their road map obligations, that's what they can do by bringing issues
to the committee that General Fraser will head; they need to move
forward on the kind of work that Tony Blair is doing to improve the
lives of Palestinians, to give an economic and political base for the
state; and third, they need to -- and most importantly -- they need to
negotiate the actual outlines, the actual peace agreement. And those
three will interact with one another.
I mean, if I
could just step back for a second, the reason that we haven't really
been able to move forward on the peace process for a number of years
is that we were stuck in the sequentiality of the road map. So you had
to do the first phase of the road map before you moved on to the third
phase of the road map, which was the actual negotiations of final
status.
What Annapolis
did was to break that tight sequentiality and to say, you can do these
in parallel -- you can do road map obligations and negotiation for the
final status in parallel.
When the peace
treaty is done, it will be subject to people having fulfilled their
road map obligations in phase one, but you can see how if you're
waiting to fulfill the first phase road map obligations you would
actually not get to the negotiations of the peace treaty. So that's
why Annapolis broke that tight sequence.
QUESTION:
Can you see a
scenario in which final status negotiations are essentially concluded
before phase one is even agreed upon or delivered?
SECRETARY RICE:
I think they could conclude a peace treaty, certainly -- a final
status agreement. But in order to implement it, I think if you read
the first phase road map obligations you see that you're not going to
really be able to stand up a Palestinian state until those are
implemented. That's why we want to move these in parallel and move
them very quickly in parallel. It's why -- it's undoubtedly more
ambitious to move them in parallel, but I can't emphasize enough to
you the degree to which if you try to do them in sequence you don't
have the kind of force and power of moving toward final status to help
people really pay attention to their road map obligations, and that's
what we've needed. The Palestinians need to be able to see that there
is a state, a viable, contiguous state in the future. That's why
moving forward on the negotiations is important.
Frontières, la "ligne 67 plus"
Président George Bush
Achieving an agreement will require painful political concessions by
both sides. While territory is an issue for both parties to decide, I
believe that any peace agreement between them will require mutually
agreed adjustments to the armistice lines of 1949 to reflect current
realities and to ensure that the Palestinian state is viable and
contiguous. I believe we need to look to the establishment of a
Palestinian state and new international mechanisms, including
compensation, to resolve the refugee issue.
I reaffirm to each leader that implementation of any agreement is
subject to implementation of the road map. Neither party should
undertake any activity that contravenes road map obligations or
prejudices the final status negotiations. On the Israeli side that
includes ending settlement expansion and removing unauthorized
outposts. On the Palestinian side that includes confronting terrorists
and dismantling terrorist infrastructure.
I know Jerusalem is a tough issue. Both sides have deeply felt
political and religious concerns. I fully understand that finding a
solution to this issue will be one of the most difficult challenges on
the road to peace, but that is the road we have chosen to walk.
Condoleezza Rice
QUESTION:
So when you speak about the President, I was wondering what you see as
the practical implications of the letter that he wrote in 2004. Do you
agree with the Israeli position that it was an acknowledgment that
Israel would have sovereignty over certain settlement blocs? And in
terms of the settlements and the roadmaps calling for a freeze in
settlements, do you see Jerusalem settlements -- East Jerusalem as
being part of the call to be frozen or are they -- is Israel allowed
to be building in them because there has been a consensus?
SECRETARY RICE:
The United States doesn't make a distinction. The roadmap obligations
are on settlement activity generally. Now --
QUESTION:
To understand, so you're saying that East Jerusalem settlements also
need to be halted?
SECRETARY RICE:
Well, for instance, Har Homa is a settlement that the United States
has opposed from the very beginning.
QUESTION:
And Gilo and Ramot, these are also settlements?
SECRETARY RICE:
The important point here, and I'll get to the Sharon letter, but the
important point here is that one reason that we need to have an
agreement is that we can stop having this discussion about what
belongs in Israel and what doesn't. It's very clear, and that's what
the letter spoke to, that there have been important changes since the
'49 armistice and since the events of '67.
And those are
going to have to be accommodated in an agreement, but there needs to
be an agreement, because the President's acknowledgement that these
changes have taken place and need to be accommodated is the
President's acknowledgement of that, the President's willingness to
say that, which, by the way, an American President had not been
willing to say before, but an American President -- this President
also said it needs to be mutually agreed so the negotiation, the
agreement itself will finally resolve these issues and we can stop
having the discussion about what's a settlement and what isn't.
National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
Q The other question I wanted to ask is, President Bush's letter to
Prime Minister Sharon in 2004 declared that when a Palestinian state
is ultimately established, Palestinian refugees should be resettled
there, rather than in Israel, and that the borders of this new state
should reflect the, "realities of existing major Israeli population
centers in the West Bank." Now since both of those positions prejudice
final status negotiations in favor of the Israelis, why should the
Arab governments, whose assistance you're seeking to enlist on this
trip, regard that the administration is in fact a neutral broker in
these negotiations?
MR. HADLEY: That letter was issued now almost four years ago, and if
you look at the letter, it makes very clear that but those are all
issues to be negotiated on final status -- issues about refugees,
issues about borders. So these are issues that will be in the final
status negotiations that the parties have agreed to undertake now.
Q How can you assume the mantle of neutral broker if you've already
declared the U.S. policy on those things and in accords with Israel's
policy?
MR. HADLEY: Those were things that were said. They are in some sense,
as the President said at the time, recognition of some realities on
the ground. He also said in that letter that these realities have been
recognized in part of the discussions that have gone on for what a
settlement would look like now for almost two decades, if you go back
to some of the things that were done at Taba and Camp David.
Similarly, obviously the establishment of a Palestinian state is going
to have an issue -- an impact on the issue of refugees. But what we
are doing now, the President has made very clear, it's one of the
reasons why we've taken the position we have on settlements -- we do
not want to prejudice final status negotiations. We've been trying for
some time to get to the point where the parties would undertake final
status negotiations. That is now occurring. And these issues are now
before the parties. And as the President said, he is not going to
impose outcomes or positions on them. He has made very clear that the
parties are going to have to negotiate the terms of the final
settlement.
Q So what bearing does the letter actually have then, is what I'm
asking?
MR. HADLEY: It had an impact in April of 2004, at the time it was
issued, when -- as a way of giving support to Prime Minister Sharon
when he did a very bold thing, which was to decide to disengage from
Gaza. And it was an effort to show where some bold step like that
might at some point lead. But it was really issued at the time of the
Gaza disengagement, and it was something that I think helped at the
time to support Prime Minister Sharon and that very bold move.
National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
Q Yesterday, Prime Minister Olmert made a distinction about East
Jerusalem and settlements, and I assume he was talking about Har Homa.
Does the President make such a distinction when he wants the road map
followed? Is East Jerusalem different? Is Har Homa different? Do they
have to stop that?
MR. HADLEY: What we've done is said, and what the President did
yesterday, and you've heard from Secretary Rice and from me as well,
yesterday -- we go back to the road map. And the road map says that
there needs to be a halt to settlement expansion. That's what the road
map says. The road map also says that unlawful outposts should be
dismantled. And the President made very clear last night, road map
obligations are road map obligations; they need to be carried out.
As you know, the parties have agreed that they are going to be moving
forward with carrying out the road map obligations, in parallel with
their negotiations and the building of Palestinian institutions. We
have a monitoring mechanism that the President just announced that
General Frasier will be, a Air Force three-star, will be heading that
effort.
So our position is the road map obligations are clear. Both sides,
Israelis and Palestinians, need to be going forward on those road map
obligations. Obviously the Prime Minister has talked about his views
about how to approach the road map issues and to approach the
settlement issues. Our view is the settlement expansion should halt.
The Prime Minister expressed his views about how Israel is going to
undertake that point. The other thing I would say -- as you know, this
whole issue of settlements gets a lot easier once there is an
understanding between Israel and the Palestinians as to what the
territory of a new state is going to look like.
Q Just one more question on that. First of all, it would seem that
you're at odds, then, with Prime Minister Olmert on that and how that
is viewed. Correct?
MR. HADLEY: I think it's fair to say that the road map is pretty flat.
It talks about ending expansion of the -- of settlements. Prime
Minister Olmert has made some practical distinctions that they are
going to adopt in the approach they are taking to that issue. We
continue to say, road map obligations are road map obligations and
they need to be carried forth.
Similarly, on the Palestinian side, there are questions about
security. If you look at the obligations that the Palestinians have
under the road map for doing security, they are a pretty robust list
of measures. Obviously the Palestinians are starting to, if you will,
address those issues in a systematic way. They're not doing all of
them today; they can't do all of them today. They are taking an
approach to how they are going to, over time, deal with their road map
obligations.
Q Can I just follow up one more time on that? Sorry. So did the
President make clear that you view Har Homa, an East Jerusalem
settlement --
MR. HADLEY: You heard the President last night. The President said,
the road map says there should be no further settlement expansion, and
the President's position was the parties need to carry out the road
map obligations.
…
Q Can you just clarify -- first of all, the 1949 armistice, this is a
reiteration of what we discussed yesterday, with the commitments about
modification of borders -- i.e., that settlement blocks would be able
to remain -- that's what the President is saying? And when he talks
about ending the occupation, does he mean ending the occupation of the
West Bank, including East Jerusalem?
MR. HADLEY: What he says is, as we've said before, ending the
occupation that began in 1967. The borders of the new state, the
question of Jerusalem is all going to have to be negotiated between
the parties. And the President said very clearly, he could come and
lay down on the table how he would describe a new state, and he's not
going to do that, because his judgment is that is not the way to get
an enduring agreement that would have the support the leadership and
the people of the Palestinian community and Israel.
Q I understand that he was talking about ending the occupation of the
West Bank, but he's allowing for these settlement blocks to remain
with that armistice statement, right?
MR. HADLEY: He is saying, one, on terms of settlement, he stuck with
and sticking with the road map obligation. And secondly, as he said
before and people have discussed, the issue of modifications to be
agreed by the parties to the '49 armistice line is now something that
the parties themselves are talking about. But again, exactly what
those alterations and modifications would be are going to have to come
out of the negotiations.
Q Aren't you creating a certain amount of confusion about the
sequencing regarding the road map versus final status negotiations? I
mean, you've indicated that some road map issues may need to wait on
the greater definition that would come from --
MR. HADLEY: No, I didn't say that they would have to wait. I said that
the parties have undertaken the road map obligations; we need -- think
they can carry forward those road map obligations. Obviously, neither
the Palestinians or the Israelis are going to be able to do everything
tomorrow under the road map obligations. They're going to have to go
forward and implement them over time. And that's a sorting-out process
that's going on.
All I was doing is noting the fairly obvious point that some of these
things get easier once the parties have an understanding about what
the state is going to look like, what its borders are going to be,
what its security arrangements are going to look like. Then some of
these issues get easier to solve. That's what I said.
Q But doesn't that give, for example, the Israelis a lot of latitude
to say -- to quote you, and say, well, we want to wait on that until
we have a better understanding of the definitions of the contours of a
state? Is it clear in the minds of both you in the administration and
the parties negotiating how this is supposed to move forward? Is it
precisely in parallel?
MR. HADLEY: In similar fashion, you could say that it gives the
Palestinians a lot of latitude as to how they will, over time, assume
and carry out their security obligations. What we would say is, look,
we're not giving them latitude; the President's position is, you've
made your undertakings in the road map, you need to carry out those
undertakings. And the parties have started to do that. We want to
assist them, we want to encourage them, we want to prod them, we want
to facilitate them through the activity of General Frasier.
But, obviously, look, this is going to take time. And the parties are
going to have to move through each of their reciprocal road map
obligations.
Q Steve, I want to just focus, if I could, on language and two
specific words -- and we'll take them in turn. The first word, I want
to draw on your much superior knowledge of the history of Mideast
peacemaking, and that is the word -- this word --
MR. HADLEY: That sounds like a setup to me. (Laughter.)
Q Indeed. And that is this word, "occupation" that the President used.
To your knowledge, has an American President ever previously referred
to the occupation? Have senior U.S. officials used that term?
MR. HADLEY: We have used that term for at least four years, five
years.
Q Who is "we"?
MR. HADLEY: The President of the United States, the administration has
used it. I think if you go back to the June 24, 2002 speech, I think
you will find this phrase: "To end the occupation that began in 1967."
You know, one of the reasons we did this -- people who say, well, is
there anything new here -- one of the things is that people have
forgotten an awful lot. And one of the reasons the President wanted to
give this statement was, it's what he was beginning to hear from the
parties. It is in a new context. Some of the language has evolved over
time. There are some new elements. But in addition, public has
forgotten how much has been said and needs to be reaffirmed by the
United States President as a way of giving impetus to these
negotiations. And that's what he wanted to do.
Les représailles économiques d’Israël / le soutien
américain à l’aide économique à Gaza
Condoleezza Rice
QUESTION:
Can you see any evidence of change underway, I mean, in Gaza Strip
because of the difficulties of the population? Can you see anything
coming?
SECRETARY RICE:
Well, first, let me first say that I do think we have to continually
be concerned about innocent people in Gaza and the humanitarian
circumstances there, because it should not be because you have the bad
fortune to be trapped in Gaza with Hamas in charge that you can't get
food or medicines or whatever. And so we've been working very closely
with the UN and working with Israel to say that that really must not
be the case.
On the other
hand, the -- Hamas, which has taken responsibility for Gaza by having
taken all of the authority, can't deliver and why can they not
deliver? Because they're isolated from the international community,
they're outside the Arab consensus. I was just asked by an Arab TV
station: well, do you think it's right that the world tries to isolate
Hamas? Well, Hamas has isolated itself. When you say, if you're Hamas,
that you're not prepared to renounce violence, when you say that
you're not prepared to live up to the agreements that Palestinian
leaders have signed, what is there left to do except to isolate Hamas?
(observation. Peu avant l’arrivée de la délégation des Et |
